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ABSTRACT 
Although threats and punishments have historically been the more prevalent tools 
of U.S. foreign policy, the current U.S. administration is signaling a reorientation toward 
a more positive inducement strategy. Much is written on incentives, but few have taken 
an in depth look at how third parties should properly place incentives to maximize their 
effect. This thesis suggests that a cognitive bargaining model may provide a useful 
analysis tool for deciding when and where to use positive incentives. The model proposed 
in this thesis uses James Fearon’s rational bargaining and war theory as a base. Then, by 
folding in Prospect Theory, a bargaining model is developed that can account for the 
effects of third party incentives. This model is put to the test by looking at Ukraine’s 
denuclearization in the early 1990s. Using the cognitive bargaining model as a 
framework, Ukraine’s bargain reached via the Lisbon Protocol in 1992 is compared to the 
one achieved in the 1994 Trilateral Agreement. This thesis finds that the cognitive 
bargaining model provides a useful analysis tool, and recommends further development 
of this model so that future offers of incentives by the United States achieve the most 
“bang for the buck.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
In 2003, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and Justice and Equality Movement 
(Jem), attacked the government in Sudan in response to the government’s oppression of 
black Africans. Since the outbreak of violence in 2003, the United Nations (UN) believes 
that 2.7 million Sudanese have been forced to leave their homes and up to 300,000 died, 
making the conflict in Darfur one of the worst humanitarian crises in decades. Many 
accuse President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir of sponsoring the ongoing genocide 
against those who oppose his government in Sudan. In fact, the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) issued a warrant for the arrest of President Bashir in early 2009. However, 
despite international condemnation, arrest warrants for President Bashir, tough sanctions, 
and peacekeeping efforts from the UN and African Union, this conflict is no closer to an 
end in 2009 than it was in 2003.1 On October 19, 2009, Secretary Hillary Rodham 
Clinton announced a new U.S. foreign policy toward Sudan, which “involves a menu of 
incentives and disincentives to achieve the Obama administration's goals.”2 President 
Obama stated, “If the government of Sudan acts to improve the situation on the ground 
and to advance peace, there will be incentives.”3 Details of the incentives offered are not 
known, but the debate about whether to offer incentives or tougher sanctions has been 
ongoing for several months. Susan Rice, United States Ambassador to the UN, argued for 
tougher sanctions, whereas Retired Gen. J. Scott Gration, the administration's special 
envoy to Sudan, proposed an end to sanctions to win support from the Sudanese 
population.4 Secretary Clinton and President Obama’s offer of incentives to Sudan, along 
with announcements that the United States is willing to sit down and talk with rogue 
                                                 
1 BBC News, “Q&A: Sudan’s Darfur Conflict,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3496731.stm 
(accessed October 21, 2009). 
2 Ibid. 
3 BBC News, “Obama Offers Sudan ‘Incentives’,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8314817.stm 
(accessed October 22, 2009). 
4 Paul Richter, “U.S. Unveils New Sudan Policy of Carrots and Sticks,” Los Angeles Times, October 
20, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editorials/la-ed-sudan21-2009oct21,0,6997528.story 
(accessed October 22, 2009).  
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regimes from Iran and North Korea, signifies a distinct shift in the foreign policy strategy 
of the United States from punishments to inducements, which is a departure from past 
U.S. foreign policy that relied much more on sanctions and military threats.  
The historical contrast between inducement and punishment efforts in U.S. 
foreign policy is made clear by inspecting the U.S.’ annual foreign assistance spending 
versus defense spending. The United States offers incentives through many branches of 
government. Arguably, the organization most responsible for providing incentives is U.S. 
aid. In 2007, the state operations plus the foreign assistance budget for U.S. aid totaled 
$34.9 billion.5 The total U.S. government discretionary spending budget for 2007 was 
$870 billion.6 For 2007, the money available for incentives through U.S. aid equated to 
approximately 4% of the government’s discretionary spending authority. In a comparison 
with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the world’s countries, 78 of 210 countries 
have a GDP greater than $34.9 billion, and over 61 countries have a GDP that is over 
double $34.9 billion.7 During the height of U.S. foreign aid spending, which occurred 
during the Marshall Plan after WWII (1947–1951), the United States only reached $64 
billion annually (as converted into 2004 U.S. dollars).8 While $64 billion may seem like a 
lot, it represents only 3% of the U.S.’ GDP at that time.9 Defense spending, in contrast, 
has always been a magnitude greater. In 2007, defense received $437 billion of the U.S. 
government’s discretionary spending,10 which equates to 50% of the U.S.’ discretionary 
spending budget. The U.S. GDP in 2007 was $13.7 trillion, which means the United 
States spent .25% of its GDP on incentives and 3.2% on defense.11 It is clear that the 
                                                 
5 USAID Web site, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/highlights07/highlights_33.html (accessed October 
21, 2009). 
6 OMB Web site (GPO Office), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/pdf/budget/tables.pdf 
(accessed October 21, 2009). 
7 World Bank Web site, Quick Reference Tables, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (accessed October 22, 2009). 
8 Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, CRS Report: “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. 
Programs and Policy,” Library of Congress (April 15, 2004): 30–31. 
9 Ibid. 
10 OMB Web site (GPO Office). 
11 World Bank, Data and Statistics, Lookup of U.S., http://go.worldbank.org/R3KBDH8YM1 
(accessed October 22, 2009). 
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United States has invested heavily into a credible “stick” for enforcing sanctions and 
other punishment strategies. This is not to say that the money spent on incentives or 
defense has not been necessary. However, it does illustrate that the United States has 
historically invested more resources into the capability to execute punishment strategies 
instead of inducement strategies.  
It is possible to argue that $34.9 billion is an ample amount to achieve U.S. 
foreign policy goals. Even so, it is obvious that resources for incentives are not unlimited. 
In other words, policy makers choosing to offer incentives must do so in the most 
economical and efficient way possible. Therefore, the United States should provide 
incentives only when necessary to achieve policy goals, in the right amount, and to the 
right persons. Let us look again at the choice to offer incentives to Sudan. The United 
States is neither a challenger nor defender in the conflict in Darfur. However, it has a 
third party policy objective of gaining an ally (Sudan) in the war on terrorism. The United 
States is faced with several choices. It must choose which side to incentivize. The United 
States could provide positive inducements to the challengers, the government of Sudan, 
or both sides to end the conflict. In other words, assume that the United States is willing 
to put $10 million toward a positive incentive package to achieve its foreign policy goals 
in Sudan. It could offer all $10 million to just the Sudan government, $10 million to just 
the SLA and Jem, or $6 million to the Sudan government and $4 million to the SLA/Jem. 
Furthermore, if the Sudan government is willing to comply with United States wishes for 
$3 million and the offer is $10 million, the United States has overspent. This begs the 
question, “How to maximize the effects of the limited resources put toward positive 
incentives to most efficiently achieve U.S. foreign policy goals?” 
B.  LITERATURE 
To answer how to maximize the effects of incentives, it is necessary to look to 
academic literature for insight. Positive influence strategies are a growing body of 
literature in the academic world, which notably resurged after the fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. As the world transitioned away from a bipolar world, within which there was a 
realist dominated foreign policy relationship, many noticed that the tough stances 
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prescribed by realism were not having the desired effect. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and 
Syria all endured the toughest U.S. sanctions and best diplomatic efforts with little effect. 
People began to remember that the, “primary goal of foreign policy is to change a state’s 
desires, not necessarily defeat them militarily.”12 The following review of literature on 
positive incentives in this thesis is important for three reasons. It provides a basis for 
where incentives fit into overall influence strategies, outlines the current thoughts and 
debates surrounding positive incentives, and identifies some important gaps in 
knowledge. 
To begin with, there are four basic influence strategies, which are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, but distinguishing between them allows for intellectual clarity. At the 
most basic level, one state attempts to influence another state through either rewards or 
punishments, which can take two forms, military and economic. Military threats fall into 
the category of coercive diplomacy. Military rewards are reassurances, which commonly 
take the form of security guarantees. Economic threats are often expressed through 
sanctions. Economic rewards are positive incentives. Table 1 shows the four primary 
influence strategies. This thesis focuses on the positive side of strategies, reassurances 
and incentives. Further, although reassurances and incentives are difficult to disentangle 
in real world applications, this thesis concentrates solely on the incentives when possible. 
 
Tool Threat Promise/Reward 
Military Coercive diplomacy Reassurances 
Economic Sanctions Incentives 
Table 1.   Range of Influence Strategies13 
Where does the current academic literature stand, regarding positive incentives? 
What do authors generally agree about, and on what do they disagree? Some authors 
focus on defining the advantages and disadvantages of positive incentives. Other studies 
                                                 
12 Stanley E. Spangler, Force and Accommodation in World Politics (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air 
University Press, 1991), xiii. 
13 Jeff Knopf, Class notes, NS4669, “Conflict and Cooperation in World Politics,” September 9, 2009. 
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identify characteristics of incentives that increase their chances of success. Much debate 
occurs about how best to weave incentives into a comprehensive foreign policy strategy. 
Most literature on incentives uses comparative case studies as evidence, with a few 
looking to empirical evidence when analyzing characteristics of successful incentives. 
For the purposes of this thesis, positive incentive authors are grouped into the pessimists, 
optimists, and the mixed strategists.  
Most critics of incentives focus on the disadvantages and challenges of 
implementing incentive strategies. Wagner argues that sanctions are more effective than 
incentives at bringing about compliance. Therefore, incentives are a less desirable 
option.14 Remmer argues that foreign aid actually increases target state’s spending while 
reducing the revenue generation. In other words, foreign aid fosters rent-seeking.15 
Remmer cites Van De Walle, 2001, who says foreign aid has allowed politicians to 
channel the aid to benefit themselves and their supporters, but has not done much to 
generate desired policy changes in target states.16 Alfie Kohn argues that incentives are 
effective at securing short-term compliance, but are poor at changing underlying 
motivations.17 He argues that rewards are not a primary motivator, they punish by leaving 
out others from offers of incentives, they rupture relationships by promoting competition 





                                                 
14 William J. Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation,” International 
Studies Quarterly 40, no. 1 (March 1996): 79, referring to Wagner’s 1988 work. 
15 Karen L. Remmer, “Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government,” American Journal 
of Political Science 48, no. 1 (January 2004): 77. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Alfie Khon, “Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work,” Harvard Business Review (September–October: 
1993), 56–59, http://home.ubalt.edu/tmitch/641/kohn_93_why_incentives_don't_work.pdf (accessed 
October 21, 2009). Although Khon focuses on the effect on individuals in a business, the principles 
logically fit the behavior of states as well. The concepts he developed are put into state-state relations terms 
from the individual terms that Khon uses. 
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discourage risk taking, and they undermine the core interests.18 Other critics argue that 
the extortion, moral hazard, and problems enforcing linkages with positive incentives 
make them less preferable when compared to sanctions.19  
Positive incentive optimists tend to believe that incentives can solve a wide array 
of foreign policy problems. Both Nincic, and Haas and Sullivan fit this characterization. 
Nincic argues that when incentives are viewed from a long-term total utility view instead 
of just an immediate marginal utility perspective, it is clear that incentives are very 
useful. Nincic makes a distinction between “trading carrots” and “catalytic carrots.” If a 
regime is unstable, incentives have a greater chance of becoming catalytic by reducing 
any rally-around-the-flag effect in the target state, bolstering the business class 
(“commercial bourgeoisie”), which typically is more open to better trading relationships, 
and modifying the future motivations of the target state. At the end of his article, Nincic 
implies that a “world without renegade regimes and nuclear proliferation” is possible by 
use of positive incentives. Nincic tends to ignore ethical issues, such as rewarding 
repulsive regimes, that are associated with positive incentives, mainly because he focuses 
on nuclear nonproliferation.20 
Similar to Nincic, Haas and Sullivan, distinguish between two types of positive 
engagement. They define conditional engagement as a strategy that employs carrots in a 
tit for tat style. In contrast, unconditional positive engagement employs carrots without a 
linkage that requires some type of reciprocal action. They argue that incentives improve 
the sender’s image in international eyes, and may lead to opportunities down the road.21 
They say the best candidates for conditional incentives are those countries where decision 
making is highly concentrated. They would agree with Nincic that countries in trouble 
                                                 
18 Miroslaw Nincic, “The Logic of Positive Enragement: Dealing with Renegade Regimes,” 
International Studies Perspectives 7 (November 2006): 324. 
19 Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 34. 
20 Nincic, “The Logic of Positive Enragement: Dealing with Renegade Regimes,” 339. 
21 Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar (Brookings Institute Press: 
Washington, D.C., 2000), 162. 
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(economic or strategically) also make good candidates for incentives.22 Haas and 
Sullivan are less optimistic than Nincic regarding the application of incentives toward 
policy goals. They argue that although engagement strategies may be applied to a wide 
range of situations, they are best used for modest and not ambitious goals.23  
Other authors make caveats or place conditions on the proper use of incentives, 
which puts them into the category of mixed strategists. Authors, such as Alexander 
George, argue that a strategy that uses both rewards and punishments is the best way to 
achieve foreign policy goals, especially from “outlaw” states.24 The thought is that by 
attacking both sides of another states’ expected utility of a certain action (both increase 
payoff for compliance through incentives and decrease the utility of defiance through 
sanctions), it is more likely to achieve the desired result. Drezner argued that sanctions 
have a potentially synergistic effect when used with positive incentives, but that sanctions 
have a low chance of success when used versus an adversary.25 Bernauer and Ruloff 
argue that asymmetries of preferences and capabilities are necessary preconditions for 
incentives to work between two parties.26 Dorussen also focuses on incentives in a two-
party bargaining situation. He argues that incentives are more effective in a bargaining 
situation than sanctions, especially when the two parties involved are future oriented. He 
implies that outside of a bargaining situation, another strategy may be more applicable. 
Like Drezner, though, he argues that differences in capabilities make incentives possible 
in a two-party negotiation.27 Long noted that incentives work on two levels by increasing 
the base of political support in the target country over time, while also encouraging 
national level cooperation. Conversely, sanctions may polarize two states in conflict and 
induce a “rally around the flag” effect. He also notes that it is important to consider those 
who may benefit economically from the offered incentives, so that the incentives do not 
                                                 
22 Haass and Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar, 162, 164. 
23 Ibid., 167. 
24 Nincic, 322, in reference to Alexander George’s work in 1993, Ch. 4. 
25 Han Dorussen, “Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives,” 
Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (March 2001): 259. 
26 Bernauer and Ruloff, The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms, 16–17. 
27 Dorussen, “Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives,” 260. 
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cause opposition from political entities that do not benefit from the incentives.28 
Although fairly optimistic, Long argues that an existing trading relationship and a 
minimum degree of trust are prerequisites for the success of an incentive strategy.29, 
Long states, that because of these preconditions, incentives may be inappropriate for 
weak states, revolutionary states, or nonstate actors, which is the opposite of what 
incentive optimists, such as Nincic, and Haas and Sullivan, argue. Long also argues that 
incentives are not useful for punishment, short-term prevention, or a demonstration of 
resolve. In these cases, sanctions are better.30 
Most authors would argue that incentives pose both advantages and 
disadvantages. Bernauer and Ruloff summarized these well. Figure 1 lists common 
advantages and disadvantages of positive incentives from Bernauer and Ruloff. 
                                                 
28 Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation,” 77–83. 
29 Ibid., 98–101. 
30 Ibid., 103. 
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Advantages Disadvantages 
Can cause short to medium term behavior 
change Extortion 
When capacity is low, can foster longer 
term solutions to problems Moral Hazard 
Causes less negative reaction in target state 
on matters of principle than sanctions Information Problems 
Do not require as clear of standards of 
compliance as threats Distribution Problems 
Motivates countries to provide information 
about their past, present, and future 
behavior 
Monitoring and Enforcement Problems 
 Reluctance to reward bad behavior in sending country 
 Irrationality in recipient country 
 Absence or weakness of internationally oriented group in recipient country 
 Burden and benefit sharing problem on recipient and provider side 
Figure 1.   Advantages and Disadvantages of Positive Incentives.31 
Clearly, incentive strategies are not without pitfalls, and even the way they are 
offered could have a significant effect on their success or failure. In 1975, Knor revealed, 
“sanctions are costly to the sender before an agreement is reached [whereas] incentives 
require a costly investment and represent the sender costs of an agreement.”32 Knor 
demonstrates that incentives attach a dollar value to a desired outcome, signaling how 
important it is to the sender of the incentives. Many other authors have also intently 
studied characteristics of incentives. The following list summarizes the general consensus 




                                                 
31 Bernauer and Ruloff, The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control, 34. 
32 Dorussen, “Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives,” 257, in 
reference to Knor’s 1975 work. 
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 Be sufficiently valuable to the target state to generate the desired 
behavior33 
 Be affordable by the sender34 
 Be distinguishable from sanctions,35 and not viewed as threatening to the 
target state36 
 Have sufficient domestic political support37 
 Be implemented with clear objectives and verifiable phases38 
 Have less linkage the more complicated the relationship39 
 Be coordinated with allies40 
 Have the institutional capacity (from the sender) to be properly 
implemented41 
 Be focused on stakeholders in target state that benefit from incentive and 
can influence the target state’s government decisions42 
Although much has been written about incentives, the literature is not without 
some significant gaps in knowledge. Little is written to explain how to assess whether 
incentive offers were too high. Usually an offer of incentives that is too low is obvious, 
due to rejection of the agreement by the target state. Also, almost no literature exists on 
the effects of incentives in complex relationships. Incentive literature focuses almost 
exclusively on bilateral relationships. A framework has not yet been developed that 
would allow a third party to place incentives where they are most likely to achieve the 
desired policy objective.  
 
                                                 
33 Dorussen, “Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives,” 260. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation,” 101. 
37 Haas and Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar, 166. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 176. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation,” 101. 
42 Ibid. 
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In summary, it has been relatively easy for the United States to rely on a wide 
array of powerful disincentives (or, sticks) in the past, but the fact is that they have not 
always been very successful.43 North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Iraq all stood defiant 
in the face of the United States’ (and international community’s) most severe sanctions 
and threats. Recently, as highlighted by the announcement regarding the U.S.’ foreign 
policy toward Sudan, incentives have been reinvigorated. Current knowledge about 
incentives supports this reorientation of foreign policy strategy, yet many pitfalls remain 
that must be recognized and avoided. Current literature does a reasonable job explaining 
how successful incentives are best crafted, but there is still much debate about how to use 
them most effectively. One area of literature that is still underdeveloped is how to best 
use incentives from a third party view to achieve a desired foreign policy outcome.  
C. PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER 
Policy makers must make tough decisions regarding when and to whom to offer 
positive incentives, yet the literature surrounding how much incentive to offer and 
whether incentives can achieve the desired policy effect (ex ante) from a third party 
viewpoint is still thin. As the United States is called upon to answer crises, such as the 
one in Sudan, it is as important now as ever to develop a framework for analyzing the 
best use of incentives ex ante. In general, it is usually easy to determine whether 
incentives achieved the desired policy objective after the fact (North Korea may be one 
glaring exception). However, ex ante, it is much more difficult to predict the effect of 
incentives. An analysis tool is needed that can help policy makers properly frame 
incentives from a third party point of view. This is not to say that ex ante analysis is easy. 
It is not, as information is often incomplete. However, within a clear framework, it is 
easier to determine what questions to ask and what information is needed to place 
incentives appropriately. This thesis does not seek to debate whether incentives are useful 
or not. For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that incentives are at least a viable 
policy option, but also consider that incentives are not always the right option. 
Furthermore, this work is not a continuation of the debate surrounding what leads to an 
                                                 
43 Nincic, “The Logic of Positive Enragement: Dealing with Renegade Regimes,” 323. 
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effective incentive but assumes that those crafting incentives do so in the best way 
possible to minimize their drawbacks and maximize their effect. It also is not focused on 
the use of incentives in a two-way negotiation or bargaining. In a two-way bargaining 
situation, incentives have a different effect than when offered by a third party. Rather, the 
purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework to aid policy makers in choosing how 
best to use incentives from a third party view. The cognitive bargaining model developed 
within this thesis is one attempt at a solution. The cognitive bargaining model is 
developed by first reviewing the concepts and assumptions of Fearon’s model of 
bargaining and war and then, Berejikian’s thoughts on prospect theory are incorporated. 
The model is tested by analyzing Ukraine’s bargain with Russia in 1992 and comparing it 
to the bargain reached in 1994. Within the Ukraine case study, the effect of third party 
positive incentives on the bargaining outcome are considered. It was found that the 
cognitive bargaining model shows larger than necessary incentives were used with 
Ukraine in 1992. These incentives contributed to a shift in status quo perception. 
Subsequently, Ukraine increased its demands. In 1994, the incentives offered by the 
United States were crucial to the bargain between both Russia and Ukraine. However, 
lesser incentives may have worked if the predictions of the cognitive bargaining model 
were considered during the 1992 bargain. This thesis concludes by discussing the 
limitation of the cognitive bargaining model, as well as the need for further testing and 
validation. However, due to the promising results from the case of Ukraine’s 
denuclearization, policy makers could use a cognitive bargaining framework to place 
incentives where it is possible to achieve the most “bang for the buck.”  
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II. THE COGNITIVE BARGAINING MODEL 
Where is the best place to start construction of a model that can help analyze 
where to insert third party incentives? Logically, before tackling third party effects, a 
framework that sufficiently models the interaction of two parties is essential. Such a 
model must be accurate enough for two party interactions, yet flexible enough to handle 
third party influences. It is also important to include the possibility that swaying one side 
or the other toward a third party preference may actually lead to increased instability or 
even war. Therefore, some way to bookend or account for the limits of third party effects 
is crucial. Logically, this limit is the outbreak of war, but assuming that the third party 
incentives are not offered with the goal of inducing war. To achieve a model that 
accounts for these important characteristics, this chapter starts by reviewing bargaining 
literature for a way to model two party conflicts. Then, it discusses the reasoning and 
logic behind choosing Fearon’s bargaining and war model as the basis for a cognitive 
bargaining model. Using Fearon’s model to bookend the bargaining range, prospect 
theory is then incorporated as a way to account for how third parties can influence the 
outcome of a conflict between two states. This chapter concludes by explaining the key 
variables of the Cognitive Bargaining model and discusses the theoretical implications of 
this model on analysis of third party incentives.  
To begin with, many authors use bargaining models as a framework for the 
interactions between two states in conflict. This is especially popular with game theorists. 
In fact, several game theories are based on mathematical bargaining models. Bargaining 
models have evolved considerably over the past few decades. Some leading bargaining 
model authors are John Nash, Thomas Schelling, Bueno de Mesquita, Frank Zagare and 
D. Marc Kilgour, and James Fearon. 
One of the earlier theorists to discuss bargaining outcomes was John Nash. Nash 
provided a big breakthrough in bargaining and game theory in 1950 by constructing a 
mathematical model that results in an equilibrium outcome of bargaining, commonly 
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called the “Nash Equilibrium.”44 Nash assumes that both bargainers expect to gain, and 
that they both attempt to maximize their expected utility within a given bargaining 
situation.45 Nash assumes, however, that there is a perfect information exchange between 
the two parties, and that each side understands perfectly what the other side prefers. 
When uncertainty is input into Nash’s model, the result is an increase in risk-averse 
behavior.46 However, because there is rarely complete information in real world 
bargaining, optimal outcomes (such as Nash equilibriums) rarely occur. This lack of 
accurate information also provides an incentive for negotiators to manipulate the 
information to achieve a more favorable bargain.47 Robert Powell argues that bargainers 
are often unable to commit to agreements and even have incentives to renege because of 
imperfect information.48 Ariel Rubenstein critiqued Nash for the same reason, although 
Rubenstein used Nash’s model to construct a bargaining model that accounts for multiple 
back and forth offers before settling into an agreement.49 Although Nash’s model does a 
good job of quantifying outcomes of a specific bargaining situation, it is essential to 
account for imperfect information exchange to be able to model real world bargaining 
situations. For this reason, Nash’s theory is not used as a basis for this thesis’s cognitive 
bargaining model. 
In contrast to Nash, Schelling, in Strategy of Conflict, takes a more holistic 
approach to bargaining. He proposes that two parties in conflict usually settle onto key 
focus points, which drive the negotiating dialogue. A successful bargain occurs as the 
                                                 
44 Matthew O. Jackson and Simon Wilkie, “Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments 
among Players,” The Review of Economic Studies 72, no. 2 (April 2005): 544, 548–565, discussing Nash 
equilibrium outcomes. 
45 Michael D. Kanner, “Framing and the Role of the Second Actor: An Application of Prospect Theory 
to Bargaining,” Political Psychology 25, no. 2, (April 2004): 215, in reference to Nash’s 1950 work on 
bargaining models and game theory. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 216–217. 
48 Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60 (Winter 2006): 
321. 
49 Kanner, “Framing and the Role of the Second Actor: An Application of Prospect Theory to 
Bargaining,” 216, in reference to Ariel Rubinstein, “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” 
Econometrica 50, no. 1 (January 1982). 
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expectations of the two parties in conflict converge.50 Schelling approaches bargaining 
from almost the entirely opposite direction as Nash. He focuses on imperfect information, 
and the problem of how to create credible to coerce the other side in a deterrence 
situation. Schelling introduces the idea of using a bargaining strategy as a way to 
influence the outcome of a bargaining situation. He argues that by limiting the options, 
and leaving the options of the other side wide open, it makes the threat more credible. 
Since a bargain is still preferable to war, the other side likely chooses a settlement. 
Schelling is mainly focused on making threats credible in a deterrence bargaining 
scenario, where one must create bargaining power. He does introduce non zero-sum 
strategies, to include a cooperative strategy. However, because Schelling’s theory is more 
holistically focused on deterrence strategy and making credible threats, it lacks enough 
breadth to consider incentive effects and lacks enough detail to help predict bargaining 
outcomes. By forcing a situation to the brink of war to make a threat appear credible, the 
likelihood of war may actually increase and the chances of a bargain decreases. 
Therefore, Schelling’s concepts are not used for this thesis’s cognitive bargaining model.  
Bueno de Mesquita’s theory is more predictive than Schelling, yet not as steeped 
in quantifiable outcomes as Nash. Bueno de Mesquita modeled bargaining as a 
competition. Two states both make an offer. Then, they compete toward a middle ground 
solution that still maximizes their expected utility. As more information and further 
proposals are exchanged, the outcome trends toward a middle ground.51 This is similar to 
Nash who predicts a settling effect during bargaining toward a middle ground. The 
advantage of Bueno de Mesquita’s model is that by determining the initial offers of both 
sides, the likelihood of a bargaining outcome may be modeled ex ante. He does account 
for the back and forth that often occurs during bargaining, which is an attractive feature. 
However, the weakness of Bueno de Mesquita’s model is that ex ante, it simply predicts 
that the bargaining outcome can end up near the midpoint of the two initial offers, all 
                                                 
50 Spangler, Force and Accommodation in World Politics 126–127, quoting Thomas C. Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960), 21–40.  
51 Kanner, “Framing and the Role of the Second Actor: An Application of Prospect Theory to 
Bargaining,” 216, in reference to Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, 
Preferences, and Perceptions, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2003). 
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other factors being equal. Two factors that Bueno de Mesquita thinks may sway the 
outcome from the midpoint are behavior patterns and perceptions of the states in conflict. 
Specifically, behavior patterns show that states are more likely to agree to a known offer 
within their acceptable bargain region, rather than continue the uncertain bargaining 
process in the hope of further maximizing their expected utility.52 In other words, states 
often choose a know outcome, rather than continue in uncertainty. He also makes a 
convincing case that perceptions, rather than the structure of the international system, 
more accurately predict the likelihood of war through an empirical analysis of wars from 
1816–1970.53 In general, Bueno de Mesquita’s work offers three important contributions 
to the analysis of bargaining. First, perceptions are a better indicator of the likelihood of 
war than structure of the international system. Second, it is possible to include 
perceptions within theoretical frameworks. Finally, expected utility is influenced by the 
perception of the states in conflict. Although Bueno de Mesquita’s model was heavily 
considered for this thesis, it was not chosen. It is not flexible enough to account for both a 
bargain offer that results in war, as well as how third party incentives may influence the 
outcome.  
Zagare and Kilgour’s model is intriguing because it includes the effect of a third 
party. Their model classifies the three parties into a challenger, a protégé, and a defender. 
They put these three parties into a deterrence situation, and focused on the effect the third 
party alliance behavior has on deterrence success. The independent variable is with 
whom the third party chooses to align. However, their model is not detailed enough to 
account for three-way bargaining. The model does not consider the other means that a 
third party may have available (besides alignment) to influence an outcome.54 Although 
Zagare and Kilgour’s analysis of third parties is useful for deterrence purposes, the one-
dimensional focus on alignment limits its usefulness for predicting bargaining outcomes. 
Therefore, it is not chosen for the basis for the cognitive bargaining model. 
                                                 
52 Woosang Kim and Bruce Beuno de Mesquita, “How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War,” 
International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 1 (March 1995): 52–63. 
53 Ibid., 62–63. 
54 Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, “Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended 
Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (December 2003): 607. 
 17
James Fearon proposed a model of bargaining and war in 1995 that is grounded in 
rational choice theory. Fearon argues that there is always a bargaining range if war is 
costly and actors are risk neutral or risk averse. Fearon assumes that two states are in 
competition, states are unitary rational actors, they seek to maximize security, and their 
behavior is determined by the distribution of power in the system. Fearon’s theory is 
grounded in rational choice, and he contends only three reasons exist why wars occur: 
indivisibility of goods, inability to commit to bargains, or private information and 
incentives to misrepresent. Fearon’s bargaining range is defined by the probability of 
victory in war minus the costs of war for the first state, and plus the costs of war for the 
second state. Figure 1 depicts Fearon’s model. Outside of the bargaining range, either 
state A or state B should favor war to a negotiated settlement.55  
 
 
Figure 2.   Fearon's Bargaining and War Model.56 
One of the weaknesses of Fearon’s model is that even though it assumes a unitary 
rational actor, it requires one to go inside the black boxes of the states to apply it to the 
real world. How else is it possible to learn state A and B’s favorite outcome? Although 
Fearon proposes a rational choice model, he implies that the perceptions (i.e., favored 
outcomes) within each state are important. Fearon’s model also does not account for how 
different actors value different components of the favored outcomes. For example, state 
A may have little interest in keeping nuclear weapons, yet state B may have a very high 
                                                 
55 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 
(Summer 1995): 379–414.  
56 Ibid., 387. 
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interest in obtaining them. Also, real bargaining goes back and forth between states over 
a period of time. Each side learns about the commitment of the other side during each of 
the interactions. Fearon’s model is fixed at one point in time, and does not model 
bargaining processes that have several back and forth exchanges that occur over a period 
of time.  
Despite these limitations, Fearon’s bargaining and war model is a good starting 
point for the cognitive bargaining model proposed in this thesis for three reasons. First, it 
defines the limits of the analysis of incentives. Fearon’s model shows that an offer 
outside the acceptable range may result in war. This intellectually constrains subsequent 
analysis of incentives by limiting their effects to that less than war. Second, it defines 
how wide the bargaining range is, by analyzing the costs of war versus the expected 
utility of war victory. By defining the width of the bargaining range, it is possible to see 
how much room there might be for incentives to play a role in the outcome. Third, since 
Fearon uses expected utility in relation to favored outcomes, the model has the potential 
to predict where within the bargaining range an offer may fall. Fearon’s model is chosen 
as the base for the model because it frames the bargaining range, determines how much 
bargaining space is available, and has the potential for further fidelity regarding 
bargaining offers.  
While Fearon’s model is a good starting point for delving inside the bargaining 
range for further analysis, it does not accurately predict outcomes within the bargaining 
range. The dependent variable is simply the outcome of war, and more is required. The 
model should predict where within the bargaining range a bargaining agreement might 
lie. Thus, it is necessary to delve inside the unitary rational actor assumption. An 
additional conceptual tool must help understand each side’s commitment to their favored 
outcomes. Adding more depth does not come freely. The relative parsimoniousness of 
Fearon’s bargaining and war theory is intentionally sacrificed for this increased fidelity. 
However, this is needed to develop a tool that predicts the effect of third party incentives. 
To do this, it is crucial to deepen the analysis of the perceptions of the two states. 
Hoffman argues that, “perceptions are more than a part of political reality: they mold it, 
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insofar as they are the springs and fuel of action.”57 What the model needs is a way to 
predict behavior of two states within the bargaining range more accurately based on their 
perceptions.  
One theory that has potential to provide further insight is prospect theory. Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky introduced prospect theory in 1979.58 Their theory of 
decision making was developed using empirical tests of humans given the choice 
between several decisions that had the same expected utility. They found that people do 
not make decisions using a purely linear expected utility function, but instead are 
influenced by their perception of their decision as a gain or loss. Berejikian was one of 
the first to apply prospect theory to state decision making in 2002, although Levy also 
laid some of the groundwork in the 1990s.59 Berejikian only focused on the application of 
prospect theory to deterrence.60 Since deterrence is one form of influence strategy, could 
prospect theory apply to other influence strategies as well? In essence, Berejikian argued 
that states may be unitary actors, but they are not rational. He argues that state choices 
depart from rational choice through application of prospect theory. In other words, 
seemingly irrational state behavior is explainable through the cognitive lens of prospect 
theory. Berejikian explains that state behavior in deterrence varies based on how a 
situation is framed. If a situation is framed as a gain, most people are risk averse and 
settle for a sure small gain, instead of risking it all to obtain a larger gain. This situation is 
what is called a gains frame. If instead the situation is framed as a loss, then most people 
are risk acceptant. This is a losses frame.61 Prospect theory’s subjective utility is a  
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leading alternative to the rational choice theorists expected utility. Shown graphically in 
Figure 3, subjective utility shows how actors’ perceived value differs based on whether a 
situation is framed as a gain or as a loss in relation to the status quo.  
 
Figure 3.   Subjective Utility Function62 
A. MIXING APPLES AND ORANGES? 
Is it possible to use a rational choice model, such as Fearon’s bargaining and war 
model, and combine it with an irrational cognitive approach? Berejikian argues that it can 
be done. He says that a “blend of rational and cognitive models will provide scholars with 
a [more] comprehensive understanding …”63 The cognitive bargaining model in this 
thesis is an attempt at what Berejikian suggests is possible, although it is not the first such 
endeavor.  
                                                 
62 Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” 171. 
63 Ibid., 167. 
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Michael Kanner constructed a theory of bargaining that incorporates prospect 
theory in a Political Psychology article written in 2004.64 Kanner applied prospect theory 
to a two party bargaining situation. He uses prospect theory’s framing effect to explain 
how a weaker state can gain a more favorable bargain over a stronger state. Kanner 
suggests that an actor can manipulate the information exchange in bargaining.65 Kanner 
says that, “when preferences are unknown, actors are likely to choose 
deception/manipulation.”66 An actor creates an asymmetric information exchange by 
withholding, “information about their strategies and preferences.”67 Kanner says that by 
“changing the beliefs of the stronger state about the value and probability of future 
events, the weaker state can create a more favorable outcome.”68 The Melian dialogue is 
a classic example of what Kanner describes. The Melians argued that destruction would 
not be a gain to Athens, but a loss. Athens would gain more through a treaty than 
conquest. Although the Melians failed in convincing the Athenians, the dialogue is 
instructive for how to try to change the beliefs of a stronger state.69 Even though Kanner 
does not consider a third party within the bargaining situation, it is logical that a third 
party could also influence the beliefs of the actors. The biggest shortfall of Kanner’s 
approach, for the purposes of this thesis, is that it only focuses on the actions of the 
weaker side. It does not overlay both sides’ perceived utility. To model third party 
effects, it is necessary to consider the perceived utility of both sides when placing 
incentives. Kanner also does not account for a shift in the reference point (status quo), 
which is important once discussing third party incentives. Kanner neglects the possibility 
of war. Consider that each side in bargaining can accept, reject, counter-offer, or fight 
when an offer is on the table. Although ignoring the option of fighting may make theory  
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development easier, neglecting the war option opens the door to an unended analysis of 
incentives. While Kanner proposes one way to incorporate prospect theory into a rational 
choice model, it is not the right fit for analyzing the effects of third party incentives.  
B. MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
This thesis develops a fresh approach for incorporating prospect theory into 
bargaining. While Kanner paved the way for applying prospect theory to bargaining, the 
model must include the preferences of both sides in conflict. To accomplish this goal, 
start by explaining the underlying assumptions. Then, the independent variables are 
defined, starting with Fearon’s bargaining and war model as the basis. Fearon’s 
independent variables are (for each state): favored outcome, expected utility (Eu) of 
winning war, the probability of war victory (p), and the proposed bargain (x). The 
perceived status quo of each state (SQ) is added to these independent variables, and the 
expected utility calculation to perceived utility (Pu) is modified. The additional 
independent variables make it possible to incorporate prospect theory so as to predict 
bargaining outcomes. Lastly, how the additional independent variables change the 
dependent variable from simply predicting war outbreak to predicting bargaining results 
are discussed. Figure 4 shows the differences between the cognitive bargaining model 




Figure 4.   Fearon’s Model vs. The Cognitive Bargaining Model 
1. Assumptions 
The first assumptions that must be addressed are those made by Fearon in his 
rational choice model of bargaining and war. For the model used in this thesis, it is still 
assumed that states seek to maximize their security. However, the states in this model are 
removed from the influence of the distribution of power in the international system, and 
thus, making it possible to isolate the bargaining range to analyze third party effects. 
International pressure is may still be accounted for in the perception of status quo by the 
two states, but distribution of power in the international system is assumed negligible. It 
is also necessary to challenge the unitary rational actor assumption. Assume that states 
are unitary actors, but this analysis cannot be limited by a rational assumption if 
incorporating prospect theory. To do so is a clear contradiction. Instead, the cognitive 
bargaining model assumes that decision-making is more influenced by the perception of 
the facts, than the facts themselves. This is absolutely critical for developing a predictive 
theory of decision making. Ex post analysis of what might have been the correct decision 
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to a bargaining problem is useful for developing lessons learned, but not for developing 
ex ante decision-making tools. Gary Schaub says, “what is more important to decision 
makers is the ex ante perception of available options and the perceived utility of those 
options.”70 The reality of bargaining is that actors rarely have perfect information about 
each other’s capabilities and intentions when decisions must be made. Therefore, the 
perception of limited information available is more important than an expected utility 
based on facts alone.  
For the remaining assumptions of this cognitive bargaining model, assume there 
are two primary states in conflict with a third party that is not already committed to one 
side or the other. Also assume the two states in conflict have the capability to either 
cooperate or not cooperate with each other. Another assumption is that they are engaged 
in a conflict where each side’s favored outcome differs from the other, and the outcome 
may include the possibility of war. An additional assumption is that the third party is 
relatively unaffected by the two states in conflict, is capable of establishing a minimum 
level of trusting relationship with both sides, and has the capability to offer positive 
incentives to either side.71 Figure 5 summarizes the assumptions for the cognitive 
bargaining model: 
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1. International structure is not considered 
2. Two states are in conflict, and the outcome could include war 
3. States seek to maximize their security, as well as achieve the best bargain 
possible. 
4. States are unitary, but not rational. State decision making follows the 
predictions of prospect theory where perceptions of the decision makers affect 
their behavior. 
5. The third party has a minimum level of trust, dialogue, and resources to offer 
incentives 
6. Incentives are not offered for the purpose of starting war 
Figure 5.   Cognitive Bargaining Model Assumptions 
2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables derived from Fearon’s bargaining and war theory are 
the probability of war victory (p), the expected utility of war (Eu), favored outcomes, and 
the proposed bargain (x). Fearon’s article, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” references 
more detailed descriptions of these variables.72 This section focuses on the differences 
between Fearon’s variables and the cognitive bargaining model variables. The two largest 
differences for the independent variables are the addition of the perception of status quo 
and the subtle change from expected utility into perceived (or subjective) utility.  
Perception of the status quo is the key to predicting a bargaining outcome. Nash 
argued that states would rarely accept a bargain that does not at least maintain the status 
quo.73 Schaub highlighted that defining the status quo is often difficult, and that the status 
quo tends to have its own inertia. In other words, states have to be motivated to stray 
from where they perceive the status quo.74 This is important to consider when looking at 
the effects of third parties in bargaining situations. Berejikian’s proposes a methodology 
for coding status quo. He argues that changes in a “state’s strategic condition” may be 
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used as a proxy for the state’s perception of their status quo condition.75 This method is 
used, when available. For the model used in this thesis, the perception of status quo is 
twofold, the perception of Status Quo by state A (SQA) and perception of Status Quo by 
state B (SQB). If a state perceives that a proposed bargain is a loss (in relation to the 
status quo), then prospect theory says the state opposes that bargain more aggressively 
than if they perceive it as simply a lesser gain.76 By coding the perception of status quo 
along the range of a favored outcome, the understanding of the bargaining situation is 
advanced. Unlike authors that make assumption about risk acceptance of states, or those 
that assume that bargaining must result in a gain, the cognitive bargaining model 
classifies a bargaining situation as win-win, zero sum, or lose-lose. Figures 6, 7, and 8 
show how these situations are coded and they depend on where the perception of status 
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Figure 6.   Lose-Lose Scenario (Negative Sum Game). 
 




Figure 8.   No-Win/Lose (Zero Sum Game). 
Overlaying the perceived status quo on Fearon’s model of bargaining and war 
makes it possible to draw several additional insights. First, a win-lose situation is possible 
in almost any scenario, depending on where the bargaining offer lies along the horizontal 
axis. However, it may force one state or the other into a choice of war. Therefore, why 
would one state be willing to accept a loss? This could occur when one state exerts 
coercive diplomacy over the other state, yet the state under pressure still sees the 
proposed bargain as preferable to war. It is interesting to note that win-win and lose-lose 
scenarios only occur when there is a difference in the perceived status quo of the two 
states. There is one other way to achieve a win-win or lose-lose, but it is not obvious by 
simply looking at the model. If two states value components of their favored outcomes 
differently, they could each trade an item they value less for an item they each value 
more. The key to identifying this possibility is looking for differences between the 
favored outcomes of the two states. If both favored outcomes are identical (just opposite 
ends of a point of view), then this other win-win scenario is not possible. Differences in 
favored outcomes are discussed more during the case study in Chapters IV and V. 
Bargaining scenarios can be generically classified as one of three possibilities (win-win, 
lose-lose, or zero sum) by determining perceptions of the status quo by state A and state 
B.  
Up to this point, the model is only one dimensional. How is it possible to expand 
the model into another dimension? The subjective utility function to set a Y-axis that is 
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equivalent to a perceived value is used. Starting with the location of the perceived status 
quo along a range of favored outcomes, the subjective utility function, as shown in Figure 
3, is overlaid. The function runs in opposite directions to show each state’s maximum 
gain as their most favored outcome. For clarity, blue is used as the color of the subjective 
utility function for state A, while red is the color of the subjective utility function for state 
B. This helps visualize the relative value of gains and losses as predicted by prospect 
theory, and translates well into the analysis of third party incentives. The height of the Y-
Axis represents the dollar amount required to achieve the corresponding effect along a 
state’s subjective utility curve as shown in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Subjective Utility Functions in the Cognitive Bargaining Model 
The inclusion of status quo and the subjective utility lines complete the cognitive 
bargaining model. They also allow for further inferences about bargaining. First, the most 
equitable gain for a win-win scenario occurs at the intersection of the two subjective 
utility lines. Second, in a lose-lose situation, the most equitable distribution of loss also 
occurs at the intersection of the two subjective utility lines. If everything is equal, these 
points occur at the halfway point between the two perceived status quos. Remember that 
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Bueno de Mesquita and Nash’s models predicted bargaining agreements generally occur 
at some midpoint between the two initial offers.77 The cognitive bargaining model 
depends less on the offers and more on where each state perceives the status quo. By 
classifying the situation as a win-win, neutral, or lose-lose, it is not necessary to limit the 
analysis to only risk neutral or risk-averse actors. Nash’s model, specifically, does not 
account for negative sum situations. In the cognitive bargaining model, state A is unlikely 
to propose a bargain that puts it in a losses frame relative to its perceived status quo. In 
other words, even if a lesser offer would increase security by ensuring a bargain short of 
war, the perception that it is a decrease from the status quo makes it unlikely that state A 
makes such an offer. Similarly, state B is unlikely to accept a bargain from state A that 
falls into the losses frame in relation to their perceived status quo. The cognitive 
bargaining model predicts that one state uses coercion or inducements, a lose-lose 
situation is more likely to result in a failure of bargaining than a zero sum or win-win 
situation.  
Incorporating subjective utility is not without drawbacks. There are two very 
difficult challenges. First, how to determine the slope of the subjective utility functions i 
to predict effects of incentives? Second, how to handle multiple issues within each state’s 
favored outcomes, which may not have the same perceived gain/loss by both sides? For 
the slope of the lines, for the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that the slope of each 
state’s subjective utility line is identical. To account for the different perceived values, 
the location of gain for state A is disaggregated from the location of the perceived loss for 
state B. The second problem is how to handle multiple components of the favored 
outcomes. In this case, the issues are grouped into an overall perceived gain or loss, and 
located along the subjective utility function for each state. This prevents having multiple 
lines for each part of the favored outcomes, which are too cumbersome for the purposes 
of this thesis.  
Although additional independent variables have been discussed, one more 
modification to Fearon’s rational bargaining and war theory must be made. It is a subtle, 
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but very important difference. States calculate the cost of war using perceived utility 
instead of expected utility. In other words, it is possible that states possess a flawless 
view of the actual costs and benefits. However, there is usually a level of uncertainty due 
to imperfect predictions of the states’ capabilities, as well as the adversaries’ forces. 
States actually make decisions based on their perception of expected utility. Therefore, 
the ends of the bargaining range are defined as p - CA (where CA is the perceived costs of 
war for state A) and p + CB (where CB is the perceived costs of war for state B). In a 
perfect world, perceived utility (Pu) and expected utility (Eu) would both be the same. 
Expected utility is easier to deduce ex post. However, to develop a model that has 
predictive power, it is essential to have a model that accounts for a utility function ex 
ante. Perceived utility by decisions-makers is available ex ante through interviews, 
intelligence, public statements, and signaling actions, although this is sometimes 
complicated by states that try to misrepresent their position. Understanding where each 
state perceives its costs for war is key to determining the width of the bargaining range 
and, for the purposes of this thesis, the limits of the effects of incentives. 
3. Dependent Variable  
By incorporating the perceived status quo and applying a subjective utility 
function, the focus shifts off Fearon’s dependent variable, the outbreak of war. Instead, 
while war is still a possibility in the cognitive bargaining model, prospect theory makes it 
possible to dive farther inside the bargaining range. Three bargaining situations are 
identified inside the bargaining range: win-win, lose-lose, and zero sum. Also, the 
dependent variable is changed to the likelihood of an acceptable bargaining agreement. 
The change to the dependent variable is important for the subsequent analysis of third 
party incentives. By changing the dependent variable, it allows this model to determine 
whether a positive incentive is likely to result in an acceptable agreement. This is an 
especially important feature for a third party that desires a specific, separate policy 
outcome.  
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C. THIRD PARTY EFFECTS 
Thus, how do incentives fit into the cognitive bargaining framework? In addition, 
if they fit into the model, does it further insight regarding incentives? The cognitive 
bargaining model is very well suited for an unbiased analysis of third party incentives 
because it disaggregates the gains and losses frames of the two states in competition. In 
doing so, a third party can analyze which state might respond more favorably to an 
incentive. By breaking down the bargaining situation, the cognitive bargaining model 
does four things for the analysis of positive incentives. It shows where a positive 
incentive might have the most “bang for the buck,” demonstrates second order effects of 
incentives on a perceived status quo, debunks several myths about incentives, and 
cautions when incentives should not be used.  
First, the cognitive bargaining model allows for cost/benefit analysis of incentives 
by a third party. The model illustrates which side of a conflict might provide the highest 
total effect from positive incentives. Although the status quo provides a reference point 
for framing gains and losses of each state, the subjective utility function is not linear. 
Consider situation A and situation B in Figure 10. Both states value an incentive equally. 
Also assume that each state has the same reference point, or perception of the status quo. 
This classifies the examples situations as zero sum. By overlaying the subjective utility 
functions, the effect of positive incentives may be analyzed. For clarity purposes, state 
A’s subjective utility function is shown in blue, whereas state B’s subjective utility 
function is shown in red. The blue and red circles represent where on the subjective 
utility curve each state perceives the value of a bargaining offer. In each case, the goal of 
the third party is to maintain the status quo to avoid a potential outbreak of war between 
states A and B. 
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Figure 10.   Effects of Third Party Incentives. 
In situation A, the third party (state C) has a 100 million-incentive budget. State A 
has made an offer that would represent a gain toward its most favored outcome. State B, 
meanwhile, would take a loss if it accepted state A’s offer. The third party has the choice 
whether to offer its incentive to state A to reduce its demand or provide a cushion to state 
B for taking a loss. The value of the incentive is represented by the height of the vertical 
green bar in Figure 10. Providing the incentive to state A to reduce its demands probably 
does not lead to a solution, because it would only be willing partially to reduce its offer 
by half. This would likely cut state B’s loss in half to match the reduction in state A’s 
demands, but state B still ends up in the losses frame. Since state B is still in the losses 
frame, they probably reject the bargain unless state A (or state C) exerts coercive 
diplomacy on state B. However, if instead the incentive is offered to state B, who values 
the incentive as much as its perceived loss, what is the result? In this case, state B accepts 
the offer by state A because the incentive offsets the loss, effectively moving state B’s 
perception back to their status quo. The incentive compensates state B sufficiently for the 
loss. Note that state A gains nothing from the incentive offered to state B in this situation.  
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In situation B, state A is makes an offer that state B perceives as a big loss from 
its status quo. In this case, providing the incentive to state B reduces the loss, but does not 
move state B back to the status quo. The incentive to state B still results in a failed 
agreement. However, if the incentive is provided to state A in exchange for giving up 
their demands, state A still nets a positive gain that is equivalent to their offer. State B is 
no longer forced into the losses frame, and the status quo is maintained. The total effect 
of the incentive in this case is multiplied. Not only does it compensate state A for 
reducing its offer, but it also moves state B back to their perceived status quo. This 
offsets any requirement to compensate state B for a loss. Situations A and B illustrate that 
framing positive incentives within the cognitive bargaining model allows for analysis of 
where they might achieve the greatest “bang for the buck.”  
Second, incentives may also have a second order effect on perception of status 
quo. If incentives become part of the status quo, removing them is equivalent to 
providing negative incentives or sanctions.78 The cognitive bargaining model shows that 
this moves the target state into the losses frame, where it may become more risk 
acceptant.79 As a caution to those who implement incentives, do not let incentives 
become part of the perceived “status quo,” unless a long-term commitment is affordable 
and desirable. 
Third, the cognitive bargaining model illuminates some misperceptions of 
incentives. Foran and Specter argue that incentives are more likely to be successful when 
the “states involved are friendly, the stronger the motive to proliferate, the more lucrative 
the incentives...and the lower the sunk costs...”80 The first claim is equivalent to saying 
peaceful states are more likely to resolve things peacefully. However, the cognitive 
bargaining model shows that even peaceful states reject bargaining agreements that are 
perceived as a loss from the status quo. For the second claim, motivation may provide 
insight into the slope of the subjective utility gains/losses lines. However, the cognitive 
bargaining model discounts motivation as a primary predictor of bargaining outcomes. 
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Instead, incentives are most useful if they adequately compensate a state such that the 
resulting agreement results in a minimum of the status quo. The third claim, more money 
leads to a better chance of success, is also a myth. The cognitive bargaining model clearly 
shows that just because more money if offered does not mean it leads to success. 
Consider situation B in Figure 10. Even if the incentive was increased from $100 million 
to $150 mMillion, it could still fail. If offered to state B, it is not adequate to cover their 
perceived loss. Figure 10 illustrates it is more important to offer the incentive to the right 
party than increase the amount of the incentive. While more money may open options, it 
is not always the right answer. This same argument applies to the claim regarding sunk 
costs. Again, the perception of status quo is a more important predictor of bargain 
settlements than how much money has already been spent. Although the cognitive 
bargaining model counters some common myths, it should not be viewed as a 
replacement for previous thought. Authors that define successful types of incentives, 
structure of incentives, and the durability of incentive arrangements are extremely 
valuable for those that have to implement incentives. The cognitive bargaining model 
should be viewed as a complement to these authors’ theories. By using the cognitive 
bargaining model to frame an incentive strategy properly, misapplication of incentives 
may be avoided. 
Fourth, the cognitive bargaining model shows that incentives are not always 
useful. One of the flaws of literature on incentives is that many focus on proving that 
incentives are a viable policy tool. In doing so, some authors ignore the security context 
and succumb to selection bias in their analysis. On the other extreme, some authors argue 
that incentives are not ever useful. Wagner argues that the “threat of losing a particular 
unit via sanctions is a more convincing argument than providing additional gain.”81 The 
cognitive bargaining model shows that the key to whether incentives are useful or not is 
where states’ perceived status quo lies. Positive incentives may not always be 
appropriate. Consider two more situations (situation C and situation D) as illustrated in 
Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.   Poor Situations for Incentives. 
In situation C, both states perceive a status quo that is more toward their favored 
outcome. Therefore, there is a potentially large win-win bargain area. A bargain that is 
favorable to the perceived status quo of both states is a win-win, and is likely to be 
accepted by both sides. In this case, no positive incentive is required for a successful 
settlement. Two states could also achieve a win-win if they trade separate bargaining 
chips, and each state values the bargaining chip they are giving up as less important than 
the one they are gaining. In either case, if a win-win occurs naturally, then an offer of a 
positive incentive by a third party only increases the potential for extortion and moral 
hazard.  
In contrast to situation C, situation D shows a situation where neither state is 
likely to find an acceptable bargain. The status quo perception is so far apart that it would 
take a huge amount of money to compensate state A or state B adequately for the 
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perceived loss. In this case, a third party (state C), may not have the means to provide 
such a large incentive. Unless each state trades a bargaining issue that is less important to 
it, a negotiated settlement is not likely. In this case, coercive diplomacy may be the only 
way to move the perception of status quo, along with changing the calculation of the 
perceived utility/costs for war.  
In this section, the cognitive bargaining model demonstrated how it may be used 
as an analysis tool for incentives. It demonstrated how to choose whom to incentivize, 
based on the subjective utility gains/losses curves. It also highlighted that if incentives 
become part of the status quo, they could move a state into the losses frame if removed. 
This is dangerous, because a state is likely to become more risk acceptant if put into a 
losses frame. The cognitive bargaining model also exposed some thoughts on incentives 
are mere myths. One of the most important aspects of the cognitive bargaining model is 
that it shows where incentives may not the right policy tool. This means that the model is 
falsifiable, and therefore, has intellectual rigor. The cognitive bargaining model shows 
promise as an analysis tool, because it is less focused on proving that positive incentives 
are the best policy tool, and more focused on determining the right application.  
D. CARROTS VS. STICKS 
Up to this point, the focus of this thesis has been on the effects of third party 
incentives. This does not mean that sanctions and threats could not be incorporated in this 
model as well. A tough sanction may negate a perceived gain, causing a state to move 
from the gains frame to a losses frame. A sanction or threat may have a similar, but 
opposite effect as an incentive. Other ways a third party could influence the model must 
also be considered. A third party could manipulate the information. By changing the 
description of the available options or the way an offer is framed, a third party may shift a 
state’s perception of the status quo.82 While both information manipulation and 
punishments are certainly useful policy tools, this thesis focuses on the positive 
incentives. It is possible that an analysis of both sanctions and incentives together could 
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be modeled within the cognitive bargaining construct. However, for the purposes of this 
thesis, the focus remains on the positive incentives and how they are accounted for within 
a cognitive bargaining model.  
This chapter introduced bargaining literature and selected Fearon’s bargaining 
and war as the base for the cognitive bargaining model. Since further insight was 
necessary, additional theoretical tools were evaluated. Berejikian and Kanner’s 
application of prospect theory to rational choice models provided one path. The 
incorporation of the perception of status quo by the two states in conflict and adjusting 
expected utility to perceived utility are the two major changes to Fearon’s model. The 
enhanced detail provided by the additional independent variables changed the dependent 
variable from the outbreak of war to the likelihood of an acceptable bargaining 
settlement. Using a greater fidelity within bargaining situations, the cognitive model 
showed promise as a way to analyze third party incentives. With the outline of the 
cognitive bargaining model cemented, the remaining chapters focus on the application of 
the model to a real world bargaining situation involving third party incentives.  
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III. UKRAINE’S 1992 BARGAIN 
The cognitive bargaining model provides some useful intellectual insights, but is 
it applicable to real world bargaining situations? Does it help the understanding of when 
to use or not use positive incentives in a given situation? To evaluate the usefulness of the 
model, a case study is chosen. Chapter I showed that the United States has a varied 
history with respect to positive incentives. Although negative forms of influence have 
been more common, the United States has used positive incentives to help avoid war 
between Egypt-Israel, North-South Korea, and Pakistan-India. Another intriguing 
application of positive incentives occurred in the 1990s. The United States offered 
incentives to several of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) republics to relinquish their 
inherited Soviet nuclear weapons. Ukraine is especially interesting, because it became the 
world’s third largest nuclear power in 1991, almost overnight. Many of their weapons 
were advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which were probably aimed at 
the United States.83 Many negotiations occurred during the course of Ukraine’s eventual 
denuclearization. In fact, the United States signed over 36 agreements between Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus before the denuclearization was complete.84 This thesis zeros in 
on two of the most pivotal agreements involving Russia and Ukraine, the Lisbon Protocol 
and the Trilateral Agreement. This chapter focuses on the events surrounding the Lisbon 
Protocol. Chapter IV subsequently contrasts the use of incentives for the Lisbon protocol 
with the incentives offered for the Trilateral Agreement, signed by the United States, 
Russia, and Ukraine in January 1994.  
This chapter begins with a review of the historical context surrounding Ukraine 
and Russia in 1991. Next, each variable is analyzed and placed into the cognitive 
bargaining model. Finally, the incentives offered in 1992 are evaluated within the 
cognitive bargaining model. It has been ascertained that the incentives offered to Ukraine 
by the United States in 1992 were greater than required.  
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A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
In 1990, the world transitioned out from under the umbrella of the Cold War. 
Numerous conflicts erupted around the FSU during 1990–1991. Ukraine, geopolitically 
situated next to several of these conflicts, was heir apparent to a large portion of the 
Soviet military forces, including the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal.85 The conflict 
areas are shown in red in Figure 12. John Mearsheimer, in a 1990 International Security 
article, argued that Ukraine should keep nuclear weapons to maintain a deterrent posture 
with Russia because Europe was headed toward destabilization.86 In 1991, 
Mearsheimer’s concern appeared valid. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Conflicts throughout the FSU in 1990–1991.87 
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With such a large nuclear inventory at its disposal and the apparent rise in 
surrounding conflicts, it seems irrational that Ukraine would hand over nuclear weapons 
to Russia, arguably their largest regional threat. However, this is exactly what Ukraine 
did. Some say this reaffirms that the “powerful do as they can and the weak suffer what 
they must.”88 However, in this chapter, the cognitive bargaining model is used to explain 
Ukraine’s ‘irrational’ decision to denuclearize while accounting for the significant impact 
of third party incentives.  
B. THE 1992 BARGAIN 
How does the cognitive bargaining model improve understanding of Ukraine’s 
denuclearization decision in 1992? Does the cognitive bargaining model adequately 
account for the outcome of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, which resulted in 
the Lisbon protocol? This begins by defining the simplifying assumptions and favored 
outcomes of both Ukraine and Russia. Each independent variable is then coded and 
overlaid on the cognitive bargaining model. The bargaining offer is placed on the model, 
and the likelihood of an acceptable agreement is determined. This section concludes by 
analyzing whether the cognitive bargaining model sufficiently accounts for this outcome.  
First, several assumptions must be considered beyond those already discussed in 
Chapter III. Ukraine and Russia are assumed to be the principal actors in conflict. 
Although the United States was heavily involved in negotiations, there was no perceived 
threat of war between the United States and Ukraine. It is also assumed that the 1992 
bargain was proposed and accepted or rejected at a single point in time. The Lisbon 
Protocol in May 1992 was a result of several months of back and forth negotiations. 
Since six months is a relative short time span in international negotiations, it was decided 
to group the negotiation outcomes between December 1991 and May 1992 to allow for a 
more comprehensive view of the bargain. Otherwise, a bargaining model must be 
developed for each preceding agreement to the Lisbon Protocol, which is overly 
cumbersome. 
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Next, the favored outcomes of each side must be defined. Russia wanted a 
Ukraine that was submissive to Russia. In November 1991, Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin protested the potential secession of Ukraine, saying that, “It could be a serious 
blow for both the union and Russia.”89 Russia attempted to maintain control over all the 
Soviet military troops and assets within Ukraine. The Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) was an attempt by Russia to maintain a dominant role in military power 
throughout the Former Soviet Union republics.90 Russia also desired control of Crimea, 
primarily because it housed the Former Soviet Union’s Black Sea Fleet, as well as space-
based tracking stations.91 Nikita Khrushchev originally transferred Crimea to Ukraine in 
1954, and some Russians viewed this transfer as nullified with the fall of the Soviet 
Union.92 Russia also did not want to have a nuclear neighbor. Russia preferred that 
Ukraine return all nuclear weapons to Russia, and they saw themselves as the only 
rightful heir to the Soviet Union’s nuclear forces. They wanted Ukraine to join the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. On the other hand, 
Ukraine wanted a fully sovereign and independent state free from Russian coercion. They 
preferred full control over former Soviet Union military assets, and did not want Crimea 
to become a separate state.93 Ukraine also resisted assuming a share of the former Soviet 
Union’s $82 billion in debt, hoping that Russia would take care of it.94  
With case specific assumptions and favored outcomes outlined, the groundwork is 
laid for the rest of the variables. This begins by inserting the same variables covered by 
the Fearon’s bargaining and war theory: probability of war victory (p), perceived cost of 
war for Ukraine (CA), and perceived cost of war for Russia (CB). These variables book 
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end the analysis of bargaining because they determine whether the available bargaining 
range was large or small. Next, the status quo points are determined for both Ukraine and 
Russia. Finally, specific components of the proposed bargain are placed along the 
subjective utility lines of both Ukraine and Russia.  
P is the probability of winning war. Ukraine had no national military in 1991. 
Ukraine was focused on consolidating and legitimizing itself as a sovereign state. In 
November 1991, Kravchuk said, “We believe no single republic is able to defend itself 
alone…our defense is integrated.”95 Kravchuk realized, very astutely, that Ukraine was in 
an extremely weak position to guarantee its own security. This was identified and 
attempts were made to bolster Ukraine’s security capacity. By early 1992, Ukraine 
established a national military. However, operational control was still extremely weak, 
and the loyalty of many of the military members was uncertain as Ukraine and Russia 
jockeyed for control of military resources.96 One significant event clearly highlighted this 
tension. In February, six pilots took off from a Ukrainian military base in Staro-
Kostiantiniv and flew their aircraft to Russia due to dissatisfaction with the breakup of 
Soviet Union forces.97 Many in other divisions based in Ukraine also refused oaths of 
allegiance to Ukraine.98 Ukraine had a very small chance of winning a military contest 
with Russia in late 1991, early 1992. Probability of war victory for Ukraine was no more 
than 25 percent. Any chance of victory would likely be attributed to outside assistance 
and not indigenous Ukrainian military capability.  
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Figure 13.   Probability of Ukraine Winning a War with Russia 
CA is Ukraine’s perceived costs for war, which was very high in 1991–1992. 
Ukraine was intensely focused on state-building and winning over varied ethnic groups 
within their borders. Ukraine’s two largest perceived threats were Russia and ethnic 
minorities (i.e., Russians). In fact, as of 1992, the perceived threat from the ethnic 
minorities was actually larger than the perceived threat from Russia (by 4%, 24%–Ethnic 
minorities, 20%–Russia).99 The concern was that a war with Russia would not only 
devastate Ukraine militarily, but could also give rise to revolts by the ethnic Russians and 
lead to further problems with Crimea. At the same time, the nationalistic forces in 
Ukraine would not hesitate to fight if their statehood and sovereignty were seriously 
threatened, even though it would clearly be a total war.100  
 
 
Figure 14.   Ukraine's Perceived Utility for War 
CB is Russia’s perceived costs for war. For Russia, the cost of fighting was also 
high. When Ukraine initially seceded from the Soviet Union, Yeltsin’s spokesman, Pavel 
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Voshanov, said, “Russia reserves the right to review its borders with any republic that 
does not sign the new Union treaty.”101 Russia quickly retracted this statement, which 
signaled that they did not desire to provoke a war. Russia perceived the cost of war as 
high, both political and militarily. Subsequently, in August 1991 there was the failed 
coup attempt against the Soviet Union in Moscow. The coup’s failure to reestablish a 
strong, central Soviet Union accelerated the remaining demise.102 As the Soviet Union 
disintegrated, Gorbachev handed over the Presidency to Boris Yeltsin in December 1991. 
During this time, there was significant internal political turbulence as factions within 
Russia adjusted to this power shift.103 However, the rise of the liberal reformers in 
Russia, who held more Western ideals, was balanced in Russia’s parliament by the 
conservative communist hardliners, which still dominated much of the Russian 
parliament.104 Allegedly, Russia initially considered war with Ukraine when it refused to 
sign the economic community treaty, according to Konstatnin Masik during 
conversations with Gorbachev and Yeltsin in Moscow. However, it is unclear whether 
this was rumor or a subversive signal by the Russian president, Yeltsin.105 Regardless, 
Russia did not go to war because they knew the costs of such an action were high. 
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuck estimated that Ukraine contained about 33% of 
the FSU’s forces.106 Ukraine had tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in its possession 
until May 7, 1992, when the last tactical weapon was officially transferred to Russia for 
dismantlement.107 Russia’s perceived costs of a war against Ukraine, who had the 
potential to use nuclear weapons if attacked, were very high.  
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Figure 15.   Russia's Perceived Utility for War 
SQU is the perception of the status quo by Ukraine. This is especially difficult to 
define in 1991–1992 since the entire security structure in Eastern Europe was in 
transition. Ukraine was risk acceptant when they stepped out and declared independence 
from the Soviet Union, despite Gorbachev’s opposition.108 However, by late 1991 to 
early 1992, status quo lines were beginning to form between Ukraine and Russia. Even 
so, both Ukraine and Russia were not entirely sure where the status quo was. Each state 
only knew where they preferred it to settle. Ukraine was very concerned that Russia 
would undermine its sovereignty, either overtly or subversively.109 On December 9, 
1991, Gorbachev said that the Russian Republic was likely to claim territory from states 
that decided to quit the USSR, mentioning Crimea specifically.110 In April 1992, Russia 
laid claim to the 14th group Army, which was stationed in Moldova. Ukraine saw this act 
as a willingness by Russia to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty.111 Ukraine also viewed 
Russia’s attempt to exert military control through the framework of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States as an attempt to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty. As a result, they 
resisted any measure that strengthened the CIS, and ultimately, withdrew altogether. 
Ukraine originally saw the CIS as a way to ensure the collapse of the Soviet Union, but 
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viewed further collaboration as overly dominated by Russia.112 Ukraine asserted itself as 
heir to former Soviet infrastructure and equipment, but also knew that Russia held a 
legitimate claim to a portion of the same, especially the nuclear forces. Ukrainian foreign 
minister Anatoly Zlentko said that Ukraine wants, “to be a neutral, non-nuclear state not 
taking part in military blocs.”113 Ukraine’s perceived status quo consisted of no real 
interest in nuclear weapons other than as a bargaining chip. This was for three reasons. 
First, there was significant domestic opposition to nuclear weapons because of the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster.114 The Ukraine Chernobyl Ministry estimated, 
“50,000 people died of ailments…more than 2.8 million, including 600,000 children have 
cancers, thyroid problems, or other illnesses…and 100,000 people lost their homes.”115 
Even if these numbers are inflated, they signal the psychological effect of the disaster on 
the population of Ukraine. Second, the international community recognized Russia as the 
sole heir to Soviet nuclear weapons. Challenging the international community was sure to 
bring about tough sanctions. Finally, the maintenance of the weapons and command and 
control structure was rooted in Russia, which caused technical problems for asserting full 
ownership of nuclear weapons.116 Professor Vasylenko of Kiev University also argued, 
“You cannot have a nuclear force that is not tied to the Russian force, because of 
technology and control systems. By being a nuclear power we would not have full 
independence.”117 Volodymir Filenko, who later became the head of the Nova Ukrainia 
disagreed. Filenko argued against giving up nuclear weapons because, “…It would upset 
the balance of power…We’re afraid of Russia…We’re fighting for independence from 
Russia.”118 Although there was disagreement about the technical feasibility of gaining 
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full control of the launch sequence and targeting information, the general consensus in 
Ukraine was that they would have more success consolidating sovereignty and gaining 
approval of the international community if they did not hold onto them. Even though 
Ukraine did not want to retain the nuclear weapons, they claimed the right to control the 
non-use of strategic weapons on Ukrainian territory.119 The resulting status quo 
perception by Ukraine in relation to their favored outcome is shown along the X-axis of 
our cognitive bargaining model in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.   Ukraine's Perceived Status Quo 
SQR is Russia’s perception of their status quo, which was also in transition from 
late 1991 to early 1992. Although Russia desired to maintain all of the former Soviet 
Union equipment and infrastructure, they realized that the newly independent states 
would probably inherit some of their Soviet empire. Realizing this, Russia quickly moved 
to claim the central media organization, the interior and foreign ministries, and the 
security and intelligence services for Russia.120 This was consistent with Russia’s 
perception of itself. Sweryn Bialer argues, “Russia was the Soviet Union. The Russian 
republic was the first among fifteen; Russian power and Soviet power were synonymous. 
Russians ruled the Soviet Union, even as local non-Russian communist elites ran the day-
to-day affairs of their own regions.”121 Russia wanted to keep as much power as possible, 
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even though the Soviet Union had failed. Russia used the protection of ethnic Russians as 
a rationale for exerting influence in FSU republics. The loss of Ukraine as a part of the 
Soviet Union was not easy for Russians to digest due to their long shared history.122 
Russia only regrettably recognized Ukraine as an independent state, and they thought that 
Russia deserved the dominant voice in the policies of all the former Soviet Republics. 
Russia sought to exert primary influence on former Soviet military personnel, policy, and 
equipment through the CIS. Russia envisioned that they would still be first among a 
combined military comprised of the 15 states of the former Soviet Union. For this reason, 
Russia did not create its own separate armed forces until much later than the other 
republics, and why it initially opposed the creation of its own separate armed forces.123 
Russia saw itself as the only rightful heir to the strategic nuclear forces of the former 




Figure 17.   Russia's Perceived Status Quo 
Next, the subjective utility curves are overlaid (Figure 18). Subjective utility 
intersects the x-axis through the perceived status quo of each state. It is important to note, 
that the bargaining situation in 1991 was a lose-lose situation. This meant that Russia 
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would have to exert some sort of coercive diplomacy if it hoped to convince Ukraine to 
sign an agreement that was less than Ukraine’s perceived status quo. Since Ukraine was 
the weaker state, it is unlikely that it had the capacity to exert coercive diplomacy on 
Russia to sway the outcome in its favor. The only other way for each state to obtain a 
gain (with respect to their perceived status quo) would be to trade an issue area it valued 
less, for one that each valued more.  
 
Figure 18.   Subjective Utility Functions Overlaid through Status Quos 
X represents the bargaining offer, or proposed bargain. In its Declaration of State 
Sovereignty July 16, 1990, Ukraine claimed a goal of neutrality as a state. It stated that it 
would “not participate in any military conflicts in other states, not join any alliances or 
blocs, and not let foreign forces use Ukrainian military bases within Ukraine.”124 On 
August 26, 1991, Ukraine’s Rada put forth a referendum that asserted both independence 
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of Ukraine as well as control of all Soviet military assets on Ukraine’s territory.125 On 
October 22, 1991, Ukraine’s parliament voted to form the Ukrainian national military. 
This was done despite Gorbachev’s warnings the day prior that it would be considered a 
dangerous and unconstitutional act. On October 24, Ukraine stated that the nuclear 
weapons on their soil belonged to Russia, but Ukraine was entitled to joint operational 
control.126 The Minsk agreement in December 1991 called for complete withdrawal of 
nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine by 1994.127 On December 12, 
1991, Ukraine formally disintegrated the Soviet military on Ukrainian soil and put the 1.5 
million former Soviet troops under the command of the Ukrainian President. January 3, 
1992, Kravchuk issued Ukrainian military oaths to all Soviet soldiers in Ukraine. Russia 
responded by issuing its own military oath on January 5, 1992 to all Soviet troops. In 
March, Ukraine fought against attempts for it to share the USSR $82 billion in debt. 
However, it ended up accepting 21.13 percent, or approximately 17 billion (U.S. dollars) 
of the debt.128 Ukraine claimed all non-strategic assets of the Black Sea fleet in April 
1992 (approximately 80% of the fleet). In response, Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
claimed 100% of the same fleet. Ukraine and Russia finally divided the fleet shortly after 
the Lisbon protocol was signed, through an 18-point accord.129 Additionally, Ukraine 
transferred its last tactical nuclear weapon to Russia by May 1992.130 Both sides went to 
the negotiating table in May 1992 and eventually signed the Lisbon protocol to the 
START I treaty. Ukraine agreed to relinquish the rest of its nuclear weapons to Russia 
and reaffirmed its commitment to join the NPT.131 This agreement was aided by U.S.’ 
technical support and financing of the denuclearization efforts.132 Specifically, the Nunn-
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Lugar legislation set aside $175 million for Ukraine.133 Additionally, the United States 
promised $155 million in economic aid to Ukraine.134 The United States also offered 
most favored nation trading status to Ukraine, which was signed by President Bush and 
Kravchuk in a meeting in Washington, D.C. in May 1992.135 Meanwhile, donors were 
gathered to raise an estimated $11 billion needed for food, medical care, housing, energy, 
and technical advice to all of the CIS countries.136 Both Russia and Ukraine relinquished 
something less important to them than what they gained. Ukraine gained more 
sovereignty by securing conventional Soviet troops and equipment on Ukrainian soil 
under the banner of the Ukrainian national military. Russia valued a denuclearized 
Ukraine more than Ukraine cared about nuclear weapons. United States’ incentives to 
Russia were the best use in 1992, since it was in the United States’ best interest for 
nuclear weapons to go to Russia from Ukraine. It was reported that Russia was 
earmarked for $600 million (U.S. dollars) in an economic assistance package.137  
The cognitive bargaining model depicts how U.S. incentives moved Russia from a 
losses frame into a gains frame in Figure 19. Incentives were indeed crucial to the 
agreement in 1992. For Russia, the gains from U.S. incentives, nuclear weapons from 
Ukraine, and Ukraine assuming its portion of the Soviet debt, outweighed the loss of 
conventional forces and the establishment of an independent Ukrainian military. No 
coercive diplomacy was required for Russia to accept the agreement. Since Ukraine did 
not highly value nuclear weapons beyond their utility as a bargaining chip, the issues that 
fell into their losses frame were minimal. Ukraine desperately needed recognition from 
the international community as an independent state and an independent sovereign 
national military. These were huge gains for Ukraine in 1992. Incentives from the United 
States were appreciated, but Ukraine was not as motivated by the U.S.’ offers of 
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incentives as they were by the recognition of independence from Russia. Since Ukraine’s 
summed perception of the bargain in 1992 was a gain from its perception of the status 
quo, U.S. incentives were not crucial to securing Ukraine’s acceptance of the bargain. 
However, Ukraine had become the 4th largest recipient of U.S. assistance almost 
overnight.138 The magnitude and relative ease of obtaining incentives from the United 
States was not lost on Ukrainian politicians. However, there were still issues untouched 
by the bargain in 1992, such as the status of Crimea. As the next chapter discussed, once 
Ukraine secured a national military and further established its sovereignty, a new 
bargaining proposal emerged. 
 
 
Figure 19.   1992 Lisbon Protocol Agreement. 
This chapter began by reviewing the security context surrounding Ukraine and 
Russia in 1991. The independent variables for the bargain between Russia and Ukraine 
were then overlaid on the cognitive bargaining model. Although some variables, such as 
perceptions of status quo were not yet solidified in 1992, the cognitive bargaining model 
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still provides insights into the bargain. Most importantly, the cognitive bargaining model 
predicts that Ukraine would have likely accepted a bargain, even without U.S. incentives. 
However, incentives clearly helped guarantee Ukraine acceptance of the Lisbon protocol. 
By offering incentives to both Ukraine and Russia, the United States ensured that the 
denuclearization of Ukraine would continue swiftly. However, as the next chapter 




IV. UKRAINE’S 1994 BARGAIN 
Shortly after the Lisbon protocol was signed and the Rada ratified the agreement, 
Ukraine increased its demands. This trend continued throughout late 1992 to early 1994. 
This begs the question, “What was different about Ukraine’s security situation, once the 
Lisbon protocol was signed?” This chapter begins by exploring the differences from mid-
1992 to early 1994. Then, Ukraine’s proposed bargain in 1994 is overlaid on the 
cognitive bargaining model. The proposed 1994 bargain is compared to the final 1994 
bargain within the context of the cognitive bargaining model. The cognitive bargaining 
model does a reasonable job of explaining Ukraine’s ever increasing demands between 
1992 and 1994, and it explains why further incentives by the United States were 
necessary for the success of the 1994 Trilateral Agreement.  
A. WHAT CHANGED? 
After the Lisbon protocol agreement in May 1992, Ukraine’s remaining nuclear 
forces consisted of 176 ICBMs and 1,240 warheads along with several strategic 
bombers.139 From 1992–1994, Ukraine demanded more and more financial aid and 
security guarantees in exchange for its strategic nuclear weapons.140 On November 10, 
1992, President Kravchuk said in a press conference, “in order for Ukraine to complete 
disarmament, we must have some material benefit and fixed guarantees for its 
security.”141 Ukrainian Ambassador Vladimir Kryzhanovsky sumamrized Ukraine’s 
economic demands in a press conference in Russia in 1993. He said that Ukraine was,  
entitled to a compensation for tactical nuclear weapons…in money, or, we 
hoped, components of nuclear power plants [nuclear 
fuel]…[Additionally,] the Western world meets Russia halfway on the 
issue of foreign debt repayment, debt rescheduling, so I believe Russia, 
our fraternal country, must treat Ukraine the same way…we suggest that 
Russia sell us gas and energy at domestic prices and the difference will be 
                                                 
139 J. F. Dunn, “The Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Debate.” 
140 Sherman W. Garnett, Lecture notes, “The “Model” of Ukrainian Denuclearization,” Presentation, 
USAF Academy, August 25, 2009. 
141 Borys Klymenko, “Ukraine Seeks Security Guarantees Compensation before Ratifying START,” 
The Ukrainian Weekly LX, no. 46 (Sunday, November 15, 1992). 
 56
our state’s debt…According to some estimates, the disposal [of the 
strategic nuclear weapons] will require $2-5 billion…If the world 
community wants Ukraine to get rid of her nuclear weapons as soon as 
possible, it should be helped…We are not demanding that the world 
community should raise our living standards…we asked for help only to 
ship away nuclear weapons.142 
Ukraine perceived that it was getting shortchanged on economic aid. Most of the 
incentives promised by the United States and others in 1992 had since gone to Russia.143 
Ukraine rejected a U.S. offer of $175 million to help with decommissioning Ukrainian 
nuclear weapons as too little.144 Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko said that Ukraine 
needed the “proper help we expect from outside, including western countries.”145 On 
October 28, 1992, Defense Minister Morozov admitted,”Ukraine still had not received 
any foreign assistance with decommissioning its nuclear weapons.”146 Some argued that 
money promised by the United States had still not been seen by Ukraine or Kazakhstan 
by the beginning of 1993.147 Ukraine’s perceived that the incentives offered under the 
Lisbon protocol were only half-heartedly implemented.148 As a result, in November 
1993, Ukraine’s Rada essentially nullified the Lisbon protocol agreement, leaving 
Ukraine’s nuclear future in doubt.149 
Ukraine also perceived a growing security gap. They viewed their primary threat 
as Russia. Ukraine saw that they were not prepared to defend themselves against Russian 
coercion. Butenko, Ukrainian President Kravchuk’s representative, said, “[Russia] has 
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territorial claims toward Ukraine and is trying to interfere in its internal affairs.”150 Lack 
of negotiating power in disputes over price liberalization and energy prices further 
highlighted Ukraine’s weak position. Ukraine realized it needed help with security. The 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Boris Tarasyuk outlined what Ukraine hoped for:  
It is a question of the nuclear states making a political commitment in the 
form of an appropriate document stating that they will regard as 
unacceptable any use or threat of force against Ukraine on the part of the 
nuclear states. Needless to say, this kind of commitment does not 
guarantee Ukraine's security, but it will be of tremendous political and 
legal importance.151 
The last reason for the increased demand in compensation for giving up nuclear 
weapons was economic troubles.152 The economy performed so poorly that Ukraine 
agreed to sell a portion of its Black Sea fleet in September 1993 in exchange for debt 
relief from Russia.153 Ukraine’s last bargaining chip was their strategic nuclear weapons, 
and they perceived that they must maximize what they could gain in exchange for them. 
The following analysis compares the variables in the cognitive bargaining model 
in 1992 to the situation in 1994. Ukraine’s perceived utility (CA2), Russia’s perception of 
status quo (SQR), and the favored outcomes of Russia and Ukraine did not change 
significantly from 1992 to 1994. There were, however, three important differences in 
1994. The probability of victory of war by Ukraine (P2) increased slightly, Russia’s cost 
of war increased (CB2), and, most importantly, Ukraine’s perception of the status quo 
(SQU) shifted to match their desire for a more favorable bargaining outcome.  
P2 is the probability of war victory by Ukraine in 1994. By 1994, Ukraine had 
finally consolidated a reliable national military. All tactical nuclear weapons had been 
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handed over to Russia.154 Ukraine still held strategic nuclear weapons, but they were not 
very useful against Russia because they were inter-continental ballistic missiles. 
Unfortunately, Russia borders Ukraine.155 Additionally, Ukraine did not have clear 
operational control of the ICBMs and the costs of maintaining them were very high.156 
Some estimate that the annual cost of maintenance was in excess of $5 billion.157 
Ukrainian Ambassador to the UN, Victor Batiouk, argued that this was simply not 
sustainable under Ukraine’s current economic condition.158 General-Colonel Bizhan, 
Deputy Minister of Defense, similarly declared, “ ... in today's economic situation, the 
Ukraine cannot consider the destruction of nuclear weapons its priority task.”159 Even so, 
there was a chance that Ukraine could develop operational control over the nuclear 
weapons, or deliver a weapon via other means, such as a strategic bomber. Although 
Ukraine could not establish a credible deterrent relationship with Russia, the chance of 
nuclear conflict was still in the back of Russia’s mind. In the meantime, a military and 
defense relationship between Ukraine and the United States had developed.160 Russia’s 
military showed signs of weakening. The chance of war victory shifted slightly in 
Ukraine’s favor due to the successful creation of a national military and a defense 
relationship with the United States. However, Ukraine’s chance of a war victory against 
Russia was still very small.  
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Figure 20.   1994–Small Change in Probability of War Victory 
CB2 is the costs of war for Russia in 1994. Throughout 1993, Russia increased its 
influence over what it called its “near abroad.” Russia questioned the status of the 14th 
Army in Moldova, interfered in the Georgia civil war, and cut off troop negotiations with 
the Baltic States.161 Additionally, some Russian politicians, likely led by Alexander 
Rutskoi and Sergei Stankievich, even questioned the sovereignty of Ukraine by putting 
forth a decree questioning Ukraine’s right to Crimea.162 However, even with increased 
aggressiveness, there were still many internal issues in Russia. Due to economic crisis, 
political clashes, and Ukraine’s recognition as an independent state by the international 
community, Russia’s cost of war with Ukraine actually increased slightly between 1992 
and 1994; thereby, decreasing their benefit of war (CB2).163 This widened the bargaining 
range slightly in Ukraine’s favor. 
 
 
Figure 21.   1994–Small Change in Russia's Costs for War 
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CA2 is Ukraine’s cost of war with Russia in 1994. By 1994, Ukraine’s costs for 
fighting a war with Russia were approximately equal. Ukraine was faced with high costs 
of maintaining nuclear weapons. It had a national military, but had not yet built a fully 
credible force.164 “Igor Derkach, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on 
Defense and State Security argued that, “were Russia to press a claim, the Ukraine would 
be unable to defend its territory with conventional weapons.”165 Ukraine appeared to be 
losing support in Crimea and its economy was in shambles.166 While Ukraine and the 
United States increased their defense relationship and military dialogue, it was still too 
early to tell whether U.S. support for Ukraine would come through in a conflict with 
Russia.167 Ukraine would still have been devastated by a war with Russia, and the costs 
in 1994 were just as high as in 1992.168  
 
 
Figure 22.   1994–No Shift in Ukraine's Cost of War 
SQU: Figure 23 shows Ukraine’s shift in status quo. Ukraine’s status quo shifted 
because Ukraine had consolidated a national government and military and achieved 
independence from Russia. With initial sovereignty established, Ukraine’s status quo 
moved toward its favored outcome in the model. Even though establishment of a 
Ukrainian national conventional military was a bargaining chip in 1992, it was no longer 
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a lever that Russia could negotiate over by 1994. Also, most of the international 
community had finally recognized Ukraine as an independent state. Ukraine realized that 
it had gained many incentives in 1992, and assumed that it was entitled to even more 
compensation in exchange for its strategic nuclear arsenal.169 Ukraine’s status quo 
perception had shifted toward its favored outcome.  
 
 
Figure 23.   1994–Ukraine's Shift in Perception of Status Quo 
SQR: Russia’s perception of status quo was not that different between 1992 and 
1994. They successfully obtained Ukraine’s tactical nuclear weapons, but strategic 
nuclear weapons were still on Ukrainian soil. Russia continually perceived that it should 
still be entitled to some influence over Ukraine and was the rightful owner of Ukraine’s 
strategic nuclear weapons. In November 1993, Russia issued a statement saying they 
would no longer help maintain Ukraine’s 176 strategic missiles.170 These statements 
were intended to pressure Ukraine further to relinquish its remaining nuclear weapons. 
Russia’s perception of status quo did not shift significantly. 
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Figure 24.   1994–No Change in Russia's Status Quo Perception 
B. THE 1994 PROPOSAL—X2 (THE PROPOSED 1994 BARGAIN)  
Figure 25 shows the shift in the bargaining range from 1992 to 1994. Realizing 
that it faced real security concerns and economic problems, Ukraine increased demands 
for security guarantees and financial assistance.171 Ukraine did not view these new 
demands as unreasonable, because the bargaining range had widened in their favor and 
their perception of status quo shifted. However, Russia refused to give money and 
security guarantees to Ukraine, which indicates that there was still a large divide in 
perception of the status quo between Ukraine and Russia. Both the United States and 
Russia rejected requests from Ukraine for an alliance. However, the United States 
referred Ukraine to the NPT, which stated that any non-nuclear state would have a friend 
in court if subject to nuclear blackmail or nuclear attack.172 The cognitive bargaining 
model predicts that Ukraine’s initial offer in 1994 was destined to fail. At the same time, 
the cognitive bargaining model also clearly explains Ukraine’s increased demands.  
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Figure 25.   Proposed 1994 Bargain.  
C. THE FINAL 1994 AGREEMENT—X2 (THE FINAL 1994 BARGAIN)  
Figure 25 showed the effect of Ukraine’s status quo shift from 1992 to 1994. The 
previous bargain was now perceived as too little compensation in exchange for nuclear 
weapons. In other words, it was now seen as a loss by Ukraine. In a losses frame, 
prospect theory predicts that actors become risk acceptant. This explains why Ukraine 
aggressively increased demands for compensation while casting doubts on 
denuclearization efforts. Unlike 1992, when the incentives offered by the United States to 
Russia were crucial, in 1994, in increase in incentives offered by the United States were 
pivotal for Ukraine. The January 14, 1994 Trilateral Statement between the United States, 
Russia, and Ukraine represents the final bargaining agreement. Figure 26 shows the 
resulting settlement is shown on the cognitive bargaining model.173 It is important to 
recognize that only increases in incentives are shown in the cognitive bargaining model  
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for 1994 because existing incentives from 1992 were now part of the status quo. It is 
important to recognize that Russia did not secure any significant additional incentives as 




Figure 26.   1994 Bargain—The Trilateral Agreement. 
Ukraine received nuclear fuel elements from Russia for its reactors, 
dismantlement assistance from the United States,174 which doubled from about $175 
million to $350 million, and security assurances from the United States and Russia.175 
According to the text of the Trilateral agreement, Russia and the United States agreed to 
“respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of the CSCE members 
states and recognize that border changes can be made only by peaceful and consensual 
means; and reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
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territorial integrity of political independence of any state…”176 For incentives, Ukraine 
received $350 million in economic aid and $350 million in dismantlement assistance 
from the United States.177 President Clinton gave an additional $200 million extra to 
Ukraine in 1994.178 It is also estimated that Russia cancelled up to $900 million of 
Ukrainian debts.179 The USAID mission to Ukraine gave over $1.4 billion in grant 
assistance from 1994 to 2000, making Ukraine the world’s third largest recipient of U.S. 
foreign assistance.180 Meanwhile, Ukraine gained $356 million in financing assistance 
from the IMF in 1994, and an additional $1.2 billion in 1995 and $777 million followed 
in 1996, for a total of $3.5 billion between 1994–1999.181 From 1991–1999, the 
European Union (EU) committed 422 million Euros, and the World Bank $2.8 billion in 
loans, although less than half was probably distributed by both organizations.182 
Meanwhile, Russia and Turkmenistan accepted the rescheduling of Ukrainian arrears and 
gas payments.183 What Ukraine did not get were the security guarantees it had been 
requesting. The reductions to Ukraine’s requests were offset by the increases in aid and 
promise of security guarantees once denuclearization was complete. In return, Ukraine 
agreed to turn over its strategic nuclear weapons within three years, ratify the START I 
treaty, and join the NPT.184 “In February 1994, Ukraine ratified the Start I treaty 
unconditionally and in November 1994, voted overwhelmingly to ratify the NPT”185  
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There is speculation that additional incentives may have been tied to the 
denuclearization agreement originally signed in 1994. For example, in June 1994, the EU 
signed a partnership with Ukraine.186 Ukraine followed through on its end of the bargain, 
and on May 31, 1996, the last Ukrainian nuclear warheads were secured on Russian 
soil.187 Shortly thereafter, a NATO-Ukraine charter was established in Madrid.188 Also in 
1997, Russia signed a “friendship and cooperation” treaty with Ukraine formally 
acknowledging the sovereignty of Ukraine’s borders for the first time.189 By 1997, 
Ukraine had become the third largest recipient of U.S. aid, totaling near $225 million in 
1997.190 
This chapter explored the contrast between Ukraine’s 1994 bargain and the 1992 
bargain. Ukraine’s offer was overlaid on the cognitive bargaining model. The proposed 
1994 bargain was then compared to the final 1994 bargain. The cognitive bargaining 
model does a reasonable job of explaining Ukraine’s ever increasing demands between 
1992 and 1994. It shows how the larger than necessary incentives offered to Ukraine in 
1992 were a big reason for this increase in demands. More importantly, it explains that 
further incentives by United States were necessary for the success of the 1994 Trilateral 
Agreement. Furthermore,. By 1994, the incentives offered by the United States were 
crucial to gaining acceptance by Ukraine, and ultimately, guaranteed the subsequent 
denuclearization of Ukraine.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Most people would agree that implementing an effective incentive strategy is a 
very difficult task. A realistic tool for analysis of expected results of incentives would 
certainly be helpful. This thesis proposes one possible solution. It is a cognitive 
bargaining model based on Fearon’s bargaining and war theory. Prospect theory is folded 
in to create a model that uses the subjective utility functions along with perception of 
status quo to evaluate the effect of an incentive on either side of a bargaining situation. 
Additionally, an actor’s expected utility calculation is changed to a perceived utility, 
which makes it possible to conduct an ex ante analysis. In addition, it is also possible to 
predict whether an offer results in an acceptable bargain. This is useful for determining 
whether a third party incentive achieves the desired effect. This thesis chose a case study 
to put the model to the test. The case of Ukraine’s denuclearization in the 1990s was 
chosen because it best matched the assumptions of the cognitive bargaining model. By 
comparing Ukraine’s bargain in 1992 to the bargain reached in 1994, strengths and 
weaknesses of the cognitive bargaining model were revealed. While the cognitive 
bargaining model has proven useful in the context of this thesis, it is important to not 
overlook the limitations, policy implications, and areas for future study. Determining 
when the cognitive bargaining model works well and when it may fail, can avoid 
misapplication and confusion over the model’s predictions.  
A. MODEL LIMITATIONS 
This thesis attempts merge a cognitive theory with a rational theory, as Berejikian 
proposed is possible. Reworking a rational theory to account for cognitive decision-
making effects is challenging. The reward is intellectual and situational insights into the 
choice of where to use incentives. However, do not forget that there are limitations. The 
cognitive bargaining model is limited in three ways: the breadth of application, 
challenges to coding the variables accurately, and inability to account for variations in 
incentive composition.  
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To begin with, the cognitive bargaining model is only good for analysis at one 
point in time. It does not handle multiple back and forth negotiations. The limitation on 
analysis is that the model must continually be updated with new information to maintain 
an accurate prediction. Evolution of cognitive bargaining theory into a Rubenstein 
bargaining model, or some other model that accounts for back and forth negotiations, 
may provide a mechanism to model real world bargaining processes more accurately.191 
Another limitation is that the cognitive bargaining model breaks down if either side does 
not value compensation. If money has such little value to the actors in conflict, then the 
effect of incentives on the situation is marginalized. In this case, another instrument of 
power may be more beneficial. The cognitive bargaining model also only accounts for 
favored outcomes of two states. This limits its applicability to some bargaining situations 
in an ever-globalizing and interconnected world. The cognitive bargaining model does 
not work for analysis of institutional bargaining among large groups of states within a 
context, such as the United Nations.  
Next, placing variables into the cognitive bargaining model also presents 
difficulties. The case of Ukraine’s denuclearization highlighted this problem. Analyzing 
expected utility based purely on capabilities is relatively straightforward, but subjective 
utility requires analysis of the decision maker and their perceptions. Although a third 
party may gain access to this information easier than a direct adversary, it is still difficult 
to obtain reliable information. Also, the cognitive bargaining model adds independent 
variables to Fearon’s bargaining and war theory. Adding additional independent variables 
takes away from the parsimoniousness of Fearon’s model. One of the additional variables 
especially difficult to determine is the perception of status quo. This is exacerbated in the 
case study of Ukraine in 1992 by a major shift in world politics caused by the fall of the 
Soviet Union. The status quo must lie somewhere between the bargain offers and the red 
lines for war. However, this is still a large range of uncertainty. When the status quo is 
long-standing, it is easier to determine. However, even when the status quo is easily 
determined, the slope of the subjective utility lines is also difficult to establish 
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objectively. Additionally, the slopes of the gains and losses functions vary based on the 
weight each actors puts on each bargaining chip. This requires a comprehensive view of 
all the bargaining chips on the table.  
Finally, the cognitive bargaining model does not account for variations in 
incentive packages. In other words, the way an incentive is packages and offered may 
very well determine its value in the eyes of the target states. The model does not 
guarantee that the policy makers construct the incentives in a way that ensures success. 
Another variation is each side may not value incentives the same way. If a state A views 
a particular incentive as lesser value than state B, this skews the analysis of where to 
input incentives as a third party. The model can account for variations in valuation of 
incentives by each side, but it requires the decision maker to delve a little deeper into the 
analysis.  
The result of these limitations is that application of the cognitive bargaining 
model is not universal. Even though the cognitive bargaining model provides useful 
insights, it leads to incorrect conclusions if applied out of context. Decision makers must 
ensure that if using the cognitive bargaining model, the assumptions and limitations are 
well understood first.  
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The cognitive bargaining model represents a tool designed to help policy makers 
make the right decisions. Throughout this thesis, the analysis has revealed several 
implications of incentives and the application of incentive strategies. Incentives may have 
a significant effect in certain situations, and marginal effect in others. There are times 
when incentives are desirable, and when they are not. In general, there are six policy 
implications that result from the analysis presented in this thesis.  
The first implication is that policy makers must start by asking the right questions. 
The questions and intelligence requests should center on determining the status quo and 
the perceived value of positive incentives for each of the states in conflict. The advantage 
of being a third party is that neither side has an incentive to misrepresent. This is true as 
long as the states in conflict are not aware that a third party is considering incentives. 
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Otherwise, the third party may run into misinformation designed to maximize an 
incentive payoff. However, within the cognitive bargaining model, there is a chance of 
detecting this possibility. Once the status quo and perceived value of positive incentive is 
known, the subsequent analysis is based on a solid footing. The situation should be coded 
as a win-win, neutral, or lose-lose. It is important to understand the perception of status 
quo first before recommending an incentive strategy.  
Second, incentives should not be used if the bargaining situation is a win-win or 
even neutral scenario. In this case, the United States is best used as a mediator to 
facilitate an agreement that falls within the win-win range. Additionally, policy makers 
should continually strive to find solutions where a hidden win-win may occur. If each 
side trades a bargaining chip they value less for one that each value more, it could also 
avoid unnecessary offers of incentives.  
Third, all factors equal, a third party achieves more “bang for the buck” by 
influencing one side to back off on its quest for gains. The summed effect is greater than 
trying to compensate for a perceived bargaining loss. When a state is in the losses frame, 
prospect theory predicts they are more risk acceptant. This translates into more costly 
offers of incentives. Figure 10 best illustrated this implication. 
Fourth, when possible, avoid letting incentives become the status quo. The case 
study of Ukraine illustrated how once incentives became a part of the status quo, the 
demands for further money increased. This was also due to the observation of how much 
money the other side (Russia) received. A third party should consider keeping offers of 
incentives private until the desired policy objective is achieved first. This helps avoid 
incentives as becoming perceived as status quo, and prevent incentive envy by the state 
that received less or no money. 
Also, even though it is attractive to use offers of incentives to hedge toward an 
agreement, be cautious about over incentivizing. Certainly, there are specific policy 
areas, such as nuclear non-proliferation, where risking failure is not an option. Even so, 
over-incentivizing is likely to lead to extortion.  
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Finally, if policy makers want to use incentives, consider the enabling conditions. 
It is possible to influence the need for incentives by altering a state’s perception of the 
status quo. In the case of Ukraine and Russia, both states had a high desire for monetary 
compensation. One could potentially lay the groundwork for incentives by increasing 
economic pressure prior to an incentive offer. An increase in perceived value of 
incentives means that a third party could achieve greater effects. Some of the harder 
forms of power could be used in conjunction with incentives. If the status quo contains 
the expectation of punishments, then the removal of the punishment, along with an offer 
of monetary compensation, is even more attractive than the money by itself. Information 
campaigns may also be used to frame the discussion around a given conflict and 
influence the perception of the status quo by one side or another. The bottom line is that 
incentives should never become the only option. Policy makers should consider ways of 
enhancing incentives, when politically feasible. Enhancing the attractiveness of 
incentives by influencing the perception of status quo and framing the issues surrounding 
a conflict helps save valuable resources.  
C. FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Although this thesis attempts to merge rational choice and cognitive theory, it is 
not a without potential flaws. Reworking a rational theory to account for cognitive 
decision-making effects is difficult. It is recommended that future efforts focus on 
determining more accurate coding methods for the variables, expand the model to 
account for mixed influence strategies, and conduct further testing.  
Ukraine’s denuclearization highlighted the difficulty of coding perceptions into 
variables. It is more difficult than analyzing expected utility based on pure capabilities. 
There is a lot of room for subjective interpretation. If it is possible to develop the right 
operational proxies for the variables contained in the cognitive bargaining model, it can 
enhance the ability to conduct an objective analysis.  
This thesis focused the cognitive bargaining model on application of third party 
incentives. However, a combined strategy of incentives and disincentives also has a 
potential for success. It may be possible to analyze both sanctions, as well as incentive 
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effects within the cognitive bargaining model. Further expansion of the cognitive 
bargaining model may allow for a more comprehensive view of influence strategies.  
Finally, the cognitive bargaining is not fully tested. One case study with 
permissive conditions for the model is hardly sufficient. Although the Ukraine case study 
was promising, it does not fully validate the cognitive bargaining model. Further research 
and testing should focus on validating the predictive capability and determining any 
critical logic failures.  
In conclusion, as the United States moves from a strategy more focused on 
punishment to one focused on engagement, positive incentives are likely to take on an 
increased role in foreign policy. The incentives recently offered by the Obama 
administration to the regime in Sudan are a shadow of what may become a more common 
approach. However, this does not mean that incentives are right for all situations. A tool 
for when to use incentives as a third party would be a powerful tool in the hands of policy 
makers. This thesis proposes a cognitive bargaining model designed for ex ante analysis. 
Although not without limitations, the cognitive bargaining model is an attempt at 
merging academic theory into a relevant policy making tool. On such merit, it deserves 
consideration for more research and study. Snyder and Diesing in Conflict Among 
Nations said, 
Whether to be firm or tough toward an adversary…is a perennial and 
central dilemma of international relations. A rational resolution of this 
dilemma depends on an accurate assessment of the long run interests and 
intentions…Conciliation of specific grievances may be cheaper than 
engaging in a power struggle.192 
As the United States moves forward, blindly offer incentives to state or non-state 
actors with the hope of achieving a policy outcome is not a good idea. The cognitive 
bargaining model provides a tool for accurate assessment that helps minimize the central 
dilemma of international relations, while preserving the U.S.’ limited national treasure.  
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By learning to do this right now, historians may look back some day and remark how the 
United States effectively applied its instruments of “Smart Power” to achieve a better 
world in the 21st century.  
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